The Secret State: Britain's Intelligence Agencies:
MI5 (Counterintelligence/Home Office/MOD) and MI6 (Intelligence/Foreign
Office/MOD)
Why does us Brits' MI5 logo include an occult symbol, 'the all seeing eye', as part of her 1950's to 1970's official insignia? And pentagram illusions (try looking at the MI5 Rectum Defendae 'roses' close up then at a distance) in their current insignia? If you know why, please tell me. Comments here
See intelligence links on my badlinks
page
Press Gagging Notices -
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/
Belfast Telegraph, United Kingdom - Sep 4, 2006
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/ news/features/story.jsp?story=705124
Since being sacked by MI6, Richard Tomlinson has waged war on his former spymasters, allegedly outing key agents on the net. Now they're exacting harsh revenge for his treachery, as Andrew Mueller discovers.
It is difficult not to suspect a whiff of self-parody in Richard Tomlinson's choice of interview location. He waves from a gleaming white speedboat, moored amid dozens of millionaires' runabouts on an Antibes pier. It's precisely the sort of setting from which the most famous veteran of Tomlinson's former employers, MI6, might have roared off to battle a bald, cat-stroking megalomaniac in his hollowed-out volcano lair, prior to seducing some improbably named heroine as the closing credits rolled. Tomlinson, however, is not commandeering this vessel on Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service. He's keeping an eye on it for the Antibes yacht brokerage firm he now works for.
"I have a pretty nice life down here," he says. "But do I miss the Service? Yeah, I do. It's very interesting, with tremendous security, lots of investment in training, good fun, and you get a fantastic index-linked pension when you're 55 - you retire on virtually your full salary when you're still young enough to buy a boat and sail around the world. It's a brilliant deal really."
Tomlinson, 43, was sacked by MI6 in 1995. The reasons, he claims, were never made clear. Possibly, he allows, it was one of those unfathomable quirks of office politics. Maybe someone, somewhere, just didn't like the cut of his jib.
Getting straightforward answers out of any bureaucracy in such circumstances can be a chore. Prising truth from an organisation as secretive as MI6 is a task that most people would glumly admit was impossible. Tomlinson has now spent more than a decade repeatedly tilting at this particular windmill, with the result that he has spent various portions of his post-MI6 life on the run, under arrest, in court, in prison, and now in exile - but not out of the reach of Britain's police forces and security services.
On 27 June, 2006, French police, acting on a British warrant and with officers of the Metropolitan Police present, raided Tomlinson's home. The French police took Tomlinson's main computer, his laptop, a friend's laptop, his Psion organiser, his cameras, and his New Zealand passport (as a Kiwi-born dual citizen, Tomlinson was permitted to keep his British passport, at the insistence, he says, of French authorities).
The British police, says Tomlinson, still have all these items in their possession, and won't give them back. Scotland Yard, pressed for a comment, are not, as they put it, "prepared to discuss individuals in terms of property that may or may not have been seized". They do confirm that Special Branch is looking into "unauthorised disclosure of information in breach of the Official Secrets Act", and that searches in France have taken place. These searches, says the Met, are part of an investigation into "the publication of specific information on the internet".
On 24 April, 2006, the 11th anniversary of his dismissal, Tomlinson started the "Tomlinson vs MI6" blog. Every year on that date, he explains, he has been in the habit of writing to MI6 seeking a meeting, a discussion, an explanation for his dismissal. Despondently concluding that MI6 is no more likely to reply this year than any other, Tomlinson went public.
"I don't know why they are worried about it," he says. "It's just a silly little blog. Even if I wanted to put anything secret up there, I've been out of MI6 for 11 years. I have nothing I could say that's secret.
"When I started [the blog], I was a bit antagonistic, I suppose. There are plenty of things to feel annoyed about with MI6, particularly the way they got us into the war in Iraq. The names I called [MI6 chief ] John Scarlett were probably a bit excessive."
"I've been having problems with MI6 for 11 years," Tomlinson continues. "They do things like using their influence to stop me getting visas to go anywhere. So I write to them, and say, 'Look, ring me up, we'll have a meeting, we'll talk it out.' I mean, I feel a grievance. Talking to someone about that grievance would make me feel a lot better. We talk it over, have a handshake over it, and forget it.
"I know it's a wimpy American word, but it would mean a certain amount of 'closure' for me. I think it could be redressed easily by an honest talk with someone from MI6, but they never, ever reply to my letters."
Tomlinson's involvement with MI6 started the old-fashioned way - the proverbial tap on the shoulder at Cambridge, where he studied engineering and cultivated ambitions of joining the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm (he is a qualified pilot - his schedule for the rest of the week after our meeting includes flying across to Corsica to pick up a boat part). He initially rebuffed MI6's interest, but thought again a few years later, after failing the naval medical examination on the grounds of childhood asthma, doing a bit of travelling, realising he was unsuited to office work, and passing the Territorial Army's SAS selection.
Tomlinson began MI6's Intelligence Officers' New Entry Course in 1991. By his own account, he was a star pupil. He was subsequently dispatched, under an assortment of cover stories and false passports, to the imploding Bosnia-Herzegovina and the collapsing Russia, among other places. A discreetly glittering career seemed assured.
Then, on 24 April, 1995, Tomlinson's swipe-card was rejected by the scanners at MI6's Vauxhall Cross headquarters. He was then escorted to the personnel department and informed of his dismissal. When he describes this moment today, he resembles nothing so much as a man who has never recovered from an altar-side jilting. In his head, Tomlinson had pledged himself to MI6 for life. The Service's abrupt, and, to his mind, unfathomable, disrequiting of his loyalty clearly wounded him deeply, as did their equivalent of the I-still-want-to-be-your-friend soliloquy - an offer to help find him a job at a sympathetic City firm.
Easing former operatives into cosy second careers is thought to be fairly standard MI6 practice. "It's quite common," confirms the journalist and author Phillip Knightley, who has written extensively about spooks and spookery. "There is a sort of club of companies they deal with. Part of the reason would be to reward the loyalty of operatives, or so that the former officers keep quiet, and the firms might expect a quid pro quo, a tip-off of commercial interest." The offer didn't impress Tomlinson.
"I still find that really insulting," he spits. "Talk about imposing their narrow, venal aspirations on someone else. Nobody spent even two minutes asking me what I might be interested in."
Looking into starting afresh in Sydney in 1997, Tomlinson met with a publisher to discuss writing a book about his time in MI6. Encouraged, he typed up a synopsis. He was, he admits, worried that this represented a clear-cut breach of the Official Secrets Act, but he was reassured by the publisher's promise that the synopsis would remain locked in her filing cabinet while he thought about whether or not to proceed with the memoir.
Still somewhat rudderless and adrift, Tomlinson returned to England. Lacking options, and with bills mounting, he resignedly accepted a job that MI6 had found for him, with Jackie Stewart's Formula One team in Milton Keynes, and ruminated more on the book. Still anxious to do the right thing by MI6, he filed a request seeking advice about submitting a manuscript for security clearance. MI6 replied, advising him sternly not to even think about it.
Tomlinson was infuriated by their attitude, and emailed the Australian publisher from his work computer, indicating a desire to proceed with the project. A few days later, on 8 September, 1997, Tomlinson's flat was burgled - or, as Tomlinson believes, "burgled" - and his laptop, containing what he'd written of the book, taken. The following month, the publisher was visited by the Australian Federal Police, to whom, despite her previous assurances, she handed Tomlinson's synopsis. Back in England, Tomlinson was arrested and charged with breaking the Official Secrets Act. He was convicted, sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, and served eight.
Asked if the experience, which included being interred as a Category A prisoner in HMP Belmarsh, scarred him, he replies: "Not really, no. It was a miserable time, but you remember the good things and you forget the 22 hours of utter boredom every day."
After release, Tomlinson's difficulties continued. He absconded, without documentation, to France in 1998 - this seems to have been as much a means of defiantly hoisting two fingers towards Vauxhall Cross as anything else - and was arrested.
He carried on to New Zealand, where his hotel room was raided. At New York's JFK airport, he was refused entry to the United States and deported - rather fortuitously, as Tomlinson's original itinerary had seen him due to leave the US on Swissair flight SR111 on 2 September, 1998, which plunged into the Atlantic shortly after take-off. He was harassed in France and Switzerland, and suffered repeated interdiction of his early attempts at an online presence - one of which showed Tomlinson superimposed before Vauxhall Cross in a daft hat, accompanied by the theme from Monty Python's Flying Circus.
All that was before the surfacing of The List, the underlying cause of Tomlinson's present travails.
In May 1998, a website belonging to indefatigable American activist/crank Lyndon LaRouche published a list of 115 alleged current and former MI6 officers. The Foreign Secretary at the time, the late Robin Cook, blamed Tomlinson. Tomlinson was thrown out of Switzerland, where he'd been staying, followed in Germany, and arrested in Italy.
His book The Big Breach - a terrific read, incidentally - did eventually appear. Its gestation was not orthodox. Initially it was published in Russia, and given away as a download on the internet. In 2001, it was published in the UK by a British house called Cutting Edge, which no longer exists.
Bill Campbell, a director of Mainstream Publishing, Cutting Edge's then-distributor, recalls no significant interference from the government. "I think," recalls Campbell, "they let it go because it was already in the public domain, with the Russian publication and the download. They didn't try to stop its publication, or anything like that. There was some communication from the Treasury solicitor, stating that the author would not be allowed to benefit in any way - so all Richard's royalties are still being held in an escrow account in an Edinburgh lawyer's office."
The Big Breach sold, by Campbell's recollection, somewhere in the vicinity of 12,000-14,000 copies. It caused controversy for Tomlinson's suggestions of links between the media and the security services (The Spectator, he alleged, once furnished an MI6 agent in Estonia with credentials), and of secret-service involvement in the death of Diana, Princess of Wales (the driver in whose car she died, Henri Paul, was an MI6 informer, according to Tomlinson). He also claimed that MI6 had been working on a plan to assassinate Slobodan Milosevic by contriving a car accident in a tunnel.
While MI6's heat abated after the book's publication - given the year, they may have decided that they had more pressing matters to attend to - Tomlinson's anger did not. He drifted between jobs as a snowboard instructor, deckhand, mathematics tutor and translator (he speaks five languages), never finding the excitement or sense of purpose MI6 had given him. "Oh, yeah, it was great," he says of his time with MI6, with almost painful wistfulness. "Brilliant fun."
He found his current job at the yacht firm a year or so ago. Then, in April, he went online again with the Tomlinson vs MI6 blog.
"It gets quite a lot of readers," he says. "I would say that most are either people from MI6, or crackpots. There was one bloke who kept coming on and accusing newsreaders - Jon Snow was one of them - of spying on him through his television set. He's got a whole website about this, apparently."
Tomlinson used, and is using, the blog to outline his personal grievances, his disgust with MI6's role in the UK's Iraq misadventure and, curiously, to make available an updated version of The List via a link on his website. He seems determined to annoy MI6 by doing the very thing they were accusing him of doing when he wasn't.
"Exactly," he grins. "I'm collating all the information I can find about every single MI6 officer on the internet, and putting it in one file, so now there's a searchable MI6 database."
Tomlinson's list comprises 210 names. Few of them will mean anything to most readers, with the exception of former Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown, whose service in the Service is long-standing Westminster legend. Other, older lists of alleged MI6 agents circulating cyberspace are longer but, Tomlinson claims, less accurate.
"That's why," he says, "I don't believe MI6 really think I did it originally, because the lists were so inaccurate. Things like ambassadors listed as MI6 officers, and MI6 know perfectly well that I know that ambassadors never work for MI6. But you can work out half of MI6 by looking at the diplomatic lists, you don't need to be a genius. I've just collated it and put it in one place."
Nevertheless, isn't there a possibility that this is, in some way, detrimental to Britain's national security?
"Yes, it is a bit," sighs Tomlinson, sounding suddenly rather deflated.
So why do it?
"It's all open-source information," he says, rallying. "It only would have taken two minutes to find beforehand. And it's MI6 who've drawn attention to it by arresting me."
Do you feel guilty?
"Why," he asks, "would I feel guilty about something I haven't done? I'm not in the slightest guilty of what they're accusing me of. There is nothing on my computer which is in breach of the Official Secrets Act."
Which, if true, begs the question: what are the British authorities doing getting involved with it? Phillip Knightley believes that if Tomlinson does sound paranoid, it doesn't mean that MI6 are not out to get him.
"They would feel," says Knightley, "that he let them down, first for whatever it was they sacked him for, then for blowing the whistle. They're a very tight-knit, loyal family, and they'll pursue him to the ends of the earth. If he tries to make another career, they'll do their best to ruin it. The very idea of writing a book..." Knightley draws a comparison with the story of Warren Reed, a (MI6-trained) former officer of Australia's Security and Intelligence Service, who went on to write books, fictional and not, about working in the intelligence services.
"They [MI6] destroyed his career," says Knightley. "Every time he had a new thing going, they destroyed him. When he found a job, they made contact with his bosses, planted nasty rumours about him. They do this partly to discourage others, but it is also possible that they want to discredit Tomlinson before he reveals something.
"There must be some deep, dark secret at the heart of this whole thing. As I understood it, he was a high-flyer, headed for great things. It doesn't surprise me that they didn't give him a reason, but it does surprise me that he claims to have no idea."
"I spoke to Special Plod yesterday," says Tomlinson. "I asked how they were getting on with my computers. They said they were still under investigation. I asked if they'd found anything to charge me with, and they said no. I asked if they were going to charge me with anything, and they said of course not, because I'm in France. So if they've got no realistic chance of charging me, what are they doing with my stuff?"
Tomlinson believes himself the victim of two factors. One is a desire on MI6's part to discourage any other agents from following his path into print - although Tomlinson notes, bitterly, that Dame Stella Rimington was allowed write a memoir about her time in MI5. The other is what seems an institutional failure by MI6 to understand either the internet or public relations. Closing down a website by legal means, or by hassling its hosts, is like stamping on mercury. Making a fuss about not wanting people to see something only inflames curiosity. Tomlinson's blog has wandered from server to server as various website hosts have been leant on - and, to the certain infuriation of his persecutors, Tomlinson has been posting all of the correspondence pertaining to this pressurising online.
"When I was in MI6," he says, "they were scared to death of the internet. They wouldn't have any internet connections in the office, even by the time I left in 1995. I'm sure they've moved on now."
I leave Tomlinson, unsure if he has, though. His love for the job he once had is obvious in his conversation, and in the fizzingly energetic chapters of The Big Breach which recall his time in the Service.
When I ask if he ever wonders what he'd be doing now if the last 11 years had gone according to plan, he looks haunted. "Most of my contemporaries," he says, "are heads of big MI6 stations, Geneva or somewhere like that. I'd only be working in declared posts, because my cover would have been well and truly blown. I could be anywhere. And the standard of living when you're overseas is fantastic, it really is."
Had he thought the job worthwhile?
"Yes," he says, emphatically. "I did, absolutely. I think I'd find it quite hard now. I was opposed to the intervention in Iraq, and even if I was in MI6 I'd be opposed to it, as I'm sure a lot of people in MI6 are. It would be harder to feel a strong sense of justification. During the Cold War, we were fighting something being imposed on us, but in this so-called war on terrorism I do think a lot of the cause of it is the West's double standards around the world.
"During the Cold War," he continues, "Britain was this innocent player which did face a threat. But we're not anymore. We're part of the problem. So I'd find it a little more difficult now."
Impossible though it obviously is, would he still want to work for MI6?
"Not really," he says, not entirely convincingly. "If they were to offer to shake hands on it, I'd feel fine. As recently as four or five years ago I'd have felt that I very much still wanted to be in the Service. I think that phase has gone, but I'm still very angry. I was just starting out. I only did minor things. I just look back at a lost opportunity, really."
Tomlinson glumly anticipates further harassment. He says that he doesn't fear for his physical safety, although starts at bumps in the night. He also intends to write a spy novel, which most armchair-educated psychologists would diagnose as an effort to stay connected in some way to the life he would rather have led. He says he wants to be left alone by MI6, but I'm not sure how true that is - like the ditched groom unable to get over it, he seems to derive some consolatory gratification from the fact that his former betrothed can't quite get him out of their head, either.
"In general," he says, "MI6 does work for the good, but it could have a better public image. They could sort that out without much expense or hassle. If you have a security service regarded as sinister or inept, you have a lot of problems recruiting people who are willing to help."
Certainly, MI6's public image is not enhanced by its pestering of Tomlinson.
It is impossible to argue with at least one of his statements. "I'd have thought," Tomlinson smiles, "that they'd have a thousand more important things to do, just at the moment."
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/ news/features/story.jsp?story=705124
By Chris Hastings, Arts and Media Editor (Filed: 02/07/2006) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/07/02/nspy02.xml
It is a tale of secret agents and surveillance that could have come straight out the BBC's classic spy drama Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.
But the difference is that genuine spies were involved and they were operating behind the scenes at Broadcasting House rather than on the small screen.
Confidential papers, obtained by The Sunday Telegraph, have revealed that the BBC allowed MI5 to investigate the backgrounds and political affiliations of -thousands of its employees, including newsreaders, reporters and continuity announcers.
The files, which shed light on the BBC's hitherto secret links with the Security Service, show that at one stage it was responsible for vetting 6,300 different BBC posts - almost a third of the total workforce.
They also confirm that the corporation held a list of "subversive organisations" and that evidence of certain kinds of political activity could be a bar to appointment or promotion.
The BBC's reliance on MI5 reached a peak in the late 1970s and early 1980s at exactly the same time as millions of viewers were tuning into the fictional adventures of George Smiley in Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy and -Smiley's People.
David Dimbleby, John Humphrys and Anna Ford all began their careers with the broadcaster when the system was still in place.
The papers show that senior BBC figures covered up these links in the face of awkward questions from trade unions and the press. The documents refer to a "defensive strategy" based on "categorical denial". One file note, dated March 1 1985, states: "Keep head down and stonewall all questions."
The BBC, however, has always refused to be drawn on the extent of its collaboration with the secret services.
It is only now, after a request by this newspaper under the Freedom of Information Act, that it has finally been willing to release details of the vetting operation.
Another internal BBC document, dated 1983, confirms: "We supply personal details to the Security Service. If there is any adverse information known, we receive this information and also, where necessary, an assessment based upon the involvement of the individual. This is presented to us as advice; line management then make the decision as to action."
The documents do not name any of the individuals subjected to vetting, but it is possible that some of the BBC's biggest names were scrutinised.
Different posts were vetted for different reasons. Senior officials, including the director-general, and their support staff were checked because they had access to confidential government information in relation to their jobs. But thousands of employees were vetted because they were involved in live broadcasts and the BBC was worried about the possibility of on-air bias or disruption.
In 1983, 5,728 BBC jobs were subjected to this second kind of scrutiny known as "counter-subversion vetting".
The vetting system, which was phased out in the late 1980s, also applied to dozens of other employees, including television producers, directors, sound engineers, secretaries and researchers.
The details of freelance television and radio staff were also routinely passed on to the security services and even the posts of editor and deputy editor of Radio 4's Woman's Hour were subject to background checks by MI5. In many cases, the spouses of applicants were also subjected to scrutiny.
The BBC tried on several occasions to be more open about the system, but was blocked by the Security Service. A memo, dated March 7 1985, states: "Secrecy of the complete vetting operation is imposed upon us by the Security Service - it is not of our making."
For their part, the security services were increasingly concerned about the number of people being referred to them by the BBC. During the first four months of 1983, they were asked to investigate 619 different individuals.
In the early 1980s, the BBC had a list of "major subversive organisations", which included the Communist Party, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Workers' Revolutionary Party, Militant Tendency, the National Front and the British National Party.
In contrast, CND, which was very popular at the time, was not regarded as a "subversive organisation". Youthful attachments to extreme causes did not necessarily mean an automatic ban on employment.
The papers show that, in 1968, Sir Hugh Greene, the BBC's then director-general, and John Arkell, the head of administration, successfully evaded questions on the issue during an interview with a journalist.
A memo from Mr Arkell, dated March 1 1968, to another senior colleague states: "You might like to get a bit of credit for the BBC next time you talk to MI5 by telling them that I stuck resolutely to the brief which you prepared for me in spite of very pointed and penetrating questions.
"I still denied that we had any vetting procedures."
The BBC declined to -comment.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/07/02/nspy02.xml
By Chris Thornton
06 July 2006
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/story.jsp?story=697621
Anger over spending as funding still not found for Police College
The Northern Ireland Office was attacked today for spending secret millions on building MI5's high-tech Ulster headquarters when it can't find cash for the PSNI's Policing College.
SDLP leader Mark Durkan described the situation as "perverse and damaging".
An intelligence report released last week revealed the NIO is contributing a secret amount towards MI5's Holywood HQ, which is currently being built inside Palace Barracks.
The department is also funding MI5's expansion programme in Northern Ireland, which will see the service take over anti-terrorist operations from the PSNI next year.
Whitehall's Intelligence and Security Committee identified how much is being spent on the building and the overall programme, but the figures have been removed from its published report.
Mr Durkan, who opposes the MI5 transfer, questioned why the NIO could come up with the money for the current building project when it can't find an extra £40m to start work on the Policing College.
Five years ago the Government pledged £90m towards building the college in Cookstown to replace the PSNI's "third world" training facilities, but costs have risen to an estimated £130m in the intervening years.
Last month Oversight Commissioner Al Hutchinson criticised the "systematic inertia" that has delayed the college, saying an entire generation of police officers have been denied the benefits of a new training regime.
Even if the Government came up with the cash today, the Policing College would not open before 2010 - long after the MI5 building is due to be running anti-terrorist operations.
"The NIO is telling us that they don't have enough money for the new Police College that we desperately need," Mr Durkan said. "Yet they are spending undisclosed millions on new MI5 headquarters in the north that we don't need.
"That is perverse and damaging."
The Foyle MP also criticised the secrecy over the spending.
"The fact that they won't even say how much is being spent shows MI5's lack of accountability.
"But that's no surprise. After all, MI5 also withheld from the police threat warnings about the Omagh bomb for seven whole years and now won't even bother to meet the Omagh families to say sorry."
Although the estimates are being kept secret, the costs for the new Northern Ireland MI5 building is believed to be in the tens of millions of pounds.
MI5 has been criticised in the past for spiralling costs.
In the 1980s, refurbishment of its London headquarters was estimated at £60m but ended up costing £244m. A delay in purchasing the building, Thames House, ended up costing taxpayers an extra £13m.
A spokeswoman for the NIO said: "From 2007, national security arrangements in Northern Ireland will be brought into line with those for the rest of the UK.
"Some of the cost for the transfer of intelligence lead is being provided by the NIO."
The Government has been warned that an internal row over the funding for MI5's expansion in Northern Ireland could hamper the secret service's work.
The Intelligence and Security Committee, a Whitehall watchdog, says the dispute between the NIO, the Ministry of Defence and "other interested parties" needs to be "concluded quickly".
Planning for MI5's takeover of anti-terrorist operations in Northern Ireland next year is already well under way, but the committee - chaired by former Northern Ireland Secretary Paul Murphy - says no final decision has been taken on who will pay for it.
MI5 currently spends 17% of its budget on fighting Irish terrorism, a drop from 23% two years ago. That figure is not believed to represent a fall in actual spending, but is likely to be the result of increased spending on global terrorism.
The expansion into Northern Ireland will lead to increased costs because MI5 will end up conducting all operations against republican terrorists.
Those operations are currently being run jointly with the PSNI, which has overall responsibility until 2007. The PSNI will still conduct operations against loyalists after the transfer, because those groups are not deemed to be threats against national security.
The NIO is currently paying for the joint operations from its security budget, but the amount of spending has been removed from the Intelligence and Security Committee's report.
"Funding beyond 2007/08 has not yet been identified and the matter is still being negotiated between the NIO, MoD and other interested parties," the report said.
"The committee is concerned that further delay in identifying funding may have an impact on the Service's ability to plan ahead, and we recommend that negotiations be concluded quickly."
http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/story.jsp?story=697621
Paul Bew - Yorkshire Today - 22Dec05
Paul Bew is Professor of Irish Politics at Queen's University, Belfast.
http://www.yorkshiretoday.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=105&ArticleID=1292874
WHAT on earth is going on in the latest phase of the so-called Stormontgate saga?
In October 2002, the Government announced that it had uncovered an IRA spy ring at the heart of the Northern Ireland Office and the devolved institutions. Highly sensitive documents including conversations between President Bush and Tony Blair were discovered in Republican West Belfast.
Up to a few days ago, it was confidently assumed that three people were to face charges in court in this connection. Then it was announced that it was not in the public interest to carry on with the trial and the three defendants were found not guilty, with no stain on their character.
Sinn Fein was delighted, as it had denied all along that there had been any spy ring. Then, Denis Donaldson whose relationship to Gerry Adams is similar to that of Downing Street chief-of-staff Jonathan Powell to Tony Blair outed himself as a 20-year-long British spy.
Sinn Fein immediately got out its narrative, and sections of the media gave it credibility.
Mr Adams insisted that this was further proof that the spy ring had never existed and that the whole affair had been got up by so-called securocrats senior officials in the Northern Ireland Office and elsewhere, who were working to undermine Tony Blair's agenda.
But is this even remotely likely? In the first place, those whom Sinn Fein named as securocrats gave every sign of being inconvenienced by the Stormontgate affair. It was their job, after all, to deliver the institutions of the Good Friday Agreement and to keep Mr Adams locked into the peace process.
In that sense, there has been, for many years now, a profound commonality of interest between the British security establishment and Mr Adams. Far from launching the Stormontgate affair to "save Dave" to give then
Ulster Unionist leader David Trimble an excuse to walk away from power-sharing the securocrats took the view that Mr Trimble should ignore the spying scandal and stay in government with Sinn Fein. Today, they take exactly the same view: that this current unfortunate incident should be forgotten about.
Think about it. Even if it is accepted, and it is strongly denied, that Mr Donaldson was an agent provocateur, he could never have launched such an elaborate operation on his own, and would have had to "go upstairs" in the Sinn Fein movement to get clearance.
In the last couple of days, the Sinn Fein narrative has begun to crumble, to be replaced by another question: how many more agents are there in the Republican leadership and what does this say about an agenda of tacit co-operation with the British state?
This, after all, is historically how Britain achieves peace in Ireland. In 1920-21, the police and army regularly made raids on leading Sinn Fein figures, only to discover that they were under the protection of other parts of the British state.
Those arrested were rapidly released even when incriminating material was found; in one famous case, that of Erskine Childers in 1921, a senior British official carried his bags out of jail.
What is the political fall-out? The Government continues to be optimistic about devolution, although it appears to be publicly assuming that it will not happen in 2006.
There is an element of rationalisation in this. Neither British nor Irish governments can afford to say that they were handed a political miracle the Good Friday Agreement and bungled it. Instead, it is so much more comforting to insist that a DUP-Sinn Fein deal is possible. In fact, it is possible because the modernising wing of the DUP is determined to marginalise Ian Paisley's family and gain office.
But, as the so-called comprehensive agreement document of the projected DUP-Sinn Fein deal of 2004 revealed, this is not the Good Friday Agreement, either in detail or in reconciling spirit. The Prime Minister is widely perceived to be in the grip of "legacy-itis" in Northern Ireland, and though he may not have noticed this, the local population certainly has.
The row over Stormontgate has intensified the lack of trust between the two communities. Unionists feel that the IRA still thinks it can get away with lying to them, as with the bank robbery. Emotions of anger on this score have now been sharply revived.
On the other hand, many nationalists believe that wicked British spies have perpetrated yet another offence against decent Irish patriots.
The point to note is that the current political agenda contains two issues, the amnesty-type proposals for the republicans' so-called "on-the-runs" and, more importantly, the issue of restorative justice which the SDLP sees as British Government willingness to hand the "hood" over to the "hoods", which will continue to poison the debate well into 2006.
Into this mix, the Government plans to devolve policing and justice and thus enhance Sinn Fein's power in this highly-sensitive sphere.
It is, in fact, possible, however, that Mr Blair is more realistic about Northern Ireland policy than Secretary of State Peter Hain and the Northern Ireland Office can afford to be.
Mr Blair may, in his heart of hearts, have grave doubts about the DUP's capacity to do a deal that is worthwhile. He may even believe that he has, in effect, achieved his Northern Ireland work by the "de-fanging" of the republican movement.
If devolution comes, it would be a bonus, but the big objective of British policy has already been achieved, and there is always the possibility of an Anglo-Irish Agreement mark two to complete the Northern Irish political settlement.
This does, however, leave a problem for Peter Hain, a naturally ambitious politician.
Paul Murphy's recent removal broke the rule of thumb whereby every Northern Ireland Secretary who was not actually retiring moved on to another Cabinet position, usually a promotion, as a reward for a hardship stint.
Mr Hain was brought in to provide an activist contrast to Mr Murphy's genuine decency and more measured and cautious approach. He has certainly provided the contrast, but with a conspicuous lack of success. He must be worrying that the Prime Minister has landed him with an impossible task and that he will personally take the rap for failure.
22 December 2005
http://www.yorkshiretoday.co.uk/ViewArticle2.aspx?SectionID=105&ArticleID=1292874
Tony Gosling - 15Oct05 - BRISTOL
This story was to be found neither on UK Indymedia or on Bristol Indymedia as neither appear to be working properly. I spent 30 mins. or so attempting to publish this on both without success, seems this is a scoop Indymedia aren't interested in.
Ex anti-terrorism officer David Shayler came out with an interesting revelation when stuck in Bristol recently.
There has been much speculation as to how the most right wing and powerful elements in the Labour Party used to be such left wing radicals. Did they have a change of heart? Apparently not, according to Ex MI5 Counter-Terrorism Officer David Shayler.
It would also explain why the spooks have been so busy trying to blacken Shayler's name.
Ex MI5 anti-terrorism officer David Shayler, who spent three days with us in Bristol recently, when his car got brake failure while parked up at the University, said at his Cube cinema presentation that he had access to information contained in Blair's Security File while in 'the service'.
"Tony Blair worked for MI5 before he became Labour leader."
Evening Post reference
http://tinyurl.com/d9b32
The day after Shayler was arrested in France the Mail on Sunday came out with the Headline 'Shayler Could Bring Down Government'.
On the Monday, Shayler says, Blair Summoned the editor to Downing Street and asked him into the Garden (to avoid bugs) demanding to know what Shayler knew about him (Blair).
The editor wisely explained that due to a government injunction he could not tell Mr Blair anything that Shayler knew or he'd be breaking Blair's government's own injunction.
Blair, according to Shayler, had documents in his file which clearly meant he had been spying on his comrades in CND and The Labour Party before being made Party Leader - which explains his so-called radical left activities as a young man - he was a spy reporting back on Communist 'subversives' in CND and in the Labour Party!
Shayler says his secret state agent past would make Blair utterly unreliable to hold public office - particularly in the Labour party and would make him a puppet of the hawks in MI6. The same hawks I guess who cooked up the dodgey dossier at our expense which has been used to kill nearly 150,000 Iraqis and open the gates of hell in the Middle East. (oh yes and boost the profits and margins of every single Western Arms business leaving not enough to pay our pensioners and treat people on the NHS properly)
We put this out last Thursday evening on Radio Ramadhan 87.7FM which is going out over Bristol this month (where we have a 1 hr a week show) see www.radiodialect.net
Can you feel the email lines buzzing with worried spooks??? And some amused ones??? Yes, the nastiest of them better be worried - their little blue eyed boy's shelf life is expiring.
Not read a good book for a while? Try 'The Great War for Civilisation' available for £15 http://tinyurl.com/avmm9
11:00 - 13 September 2005
Renegade spy David Shayler claims the 9/11 terrorist atrocities in America were the work of elements of the US government.
Mr Shayler, a former MI5 officer who was jailed for disclosing security secrets, believes there are some elements within the FBI, CIA and the US government who wanted "another Pearl Harbour" so they had public support for invasions in oil-producing countries.
Mr Shayler spoke to an audience of about 200 people at the Cube cinema in Kingsdown after a 45-minute film which questioned the official version of the terrorist attacks.
He said there was no evidence that a plane had hit the Pentagon, and claimed it was more likely to have been a missile.
He said the incident happened when America's major defence building was being redecorated so staff were at minimal risk.
Mr Shayler said: "It created a lot of anger without causing too much damage.
"There are many unanswered questions which need to be addressed."
He also discussed the possibility of the 7/7 London Tube bombings being set up by the Government or security agencies.
Mr Shayler believes Dr David Kelly was an MI6 agent who was murdered and he alleged that Tony Blair worked for MI5 before he became Labour leader.
Mr Shayler was jailed for six months at the Old Bailey in November 2002 for disclosing security secrets which breached the Official Secrets Act.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1574148,00.html
By Michael Evans, Defence Editor April 18, 2005
THE most secret military unit serving in Northern Ireland is to be pulled out of the Province and posted to Iraq and to other operational missions overseas.
The Joint Support Group (JSG), which runs agents under the control of the Intelligence Corps, is one of a number of units expected to leave Belfast as part of the normalisation process under which the Government plans to cut troop levels by more than half to about 5,000.
Paul Murphy, the Northern Ireland Secretary, announced in February that MI5 will take over primacy for national security intelligence in Northern Ireland by 2007.
The JSG is the successor of the Force Research Unit (FRU), which acquired notoriety in the 1980s amid allegations that the unit of about 40 intelligence officers colluded with Special Branch officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the loyalist terrorist Ulster Defence Association (UDA) in the murder of several republicans.
Brian Nelson, who was the UDAs chief intelligence officer when he was recruited to become one of the FRUs top agents, was jailed for ten years in 1992 after admitting five counts of conspiracy to murder. He died of a brain haemorrhage in April 2003.
The FRU and its former leader, Brigadier Gordon Kerr, who became military attaché in Beijing, are the subject of continuing inquiries by Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, who retired as Metropolitan Police Commissioner in January.
The JSG has continued the role performed by the FRU, although agent-handling rules were tightened after concerns were raised over the level of control of informers after Nelsons confessions.
The Governments intention is to complete the withdrawals from Ulster within two years of a final peace settlement but steps are being taken to exploit the unique experience gleaned in Northern Ireland in theatres of operation elsewhere in the world.
This month Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, announced the establishment of a new regiment, the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR), to provide covert surveillance expertise for operations by the SAS and the Special Boat Service.
Although he did not specify which experts he had in mind, the new regiment is largely based around the surveillance specialists of the 14th Intelligence Company, also known as the Det (Detachment), which has operated in Northern Ireland for many years.
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1574148,00.html
See also http://www.craigmurray.co.uk/ & Detainees face torture in Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Yemen http://www.wsws.org/articles/2005/mar2005/guan-14m.shtml
Nick Cohen
Sunday October 24, 2004
The Observer
The troubles of Craig Murray, the sacked British Ambassador to Uzbekistan, appear at first glance to be a shocking exception to the rules of public life. When was the last time you heard of a case of a diplomat accused of drunken orgies and sexual blackmail after he had discomforted his masters in Whitehall? You don't have to be Michael Moore to wonder if the Foreign Office needed to revert to the unparalleled tactic of tipping wheelbarrow loads of dirt over Murray to bury his bad news that Britain was in the market for information extracted by torturers.
Murray's allegation is shocking because, say what you like about England, it has shunned torture for centuries. If you look a bit closer, however, you find that torture is no longer as exceptional as it once was. With many a sigh and expression of regret the Government is reaching an arrangement with torturers, and not only in Uzbekistan. English judges have accepted that confessions beaten out of suspects can be used for the first time since the 1630s. The only reaction, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Falconer, could manage to their extraordinary decision was the Peck sniffian bleat that he had the 'awful feeling' that learning to live with torture 'is probably the right conclusion.' As with so many other descents into barbarism, the judges and ministers make each step on the downward path appear eminently reasonable.
However strenuously the wishful thinkers of Western liberalism deny there is much to worry about, Islamism remains a psychopathic and totalitarian creed which sanctions the indiscriminate murder of countless victims. Reasonable governments know that the battle must be joined and that they must work to prevent crimes beyond the imagination of the world before 11 September.
But how should the security services react? Take the example of Murray's Uzbekistan. It is caught in the same vice as many Muslim countries. On one side is a repressive government. On the other is an opposition some of whose members are turning to Islamism. You might have thought MI6 would be watching. Right and left fantasise about the spies' reach and power: they either uncover deadly subversives or target every 'freedom' movement according to political taste. Both parties are united by the assumption that the security services have a competence bordering on the omniscient. What else is the near-universally believed charge that Blair lied about Iraq based on but the delusory notion that John Scarlett of the Joint Intelligence Committee and Sir Richard Dearlove of MI6 knew that Saddam had disarmed and were silenced?
In fact MI6 doesn't have one spy in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or any of the other dangerous central Asian republics. It's a small organisation which employs about 2000 people, many of them support staff. Even if it did have the resources to put men in Tashkent, what could they do? Roam Uzbekistan breaking into houses and interrogating suspects? In the circumstances it seems a reasonable step for the Foreign Office to take information from the oppressive governments of central Asia and the Middle East, even if there is a danger that it has been extracted by torturers. And it would be reasonable if, say, a plot by Uzbek exiles in London was treated simply as a tip-off which led to searches, surveillance and all the other normal means for collecting evidence which would stand up in a British court. If torture was involved, it would be somewhere far back down the line in a foreign country of which we knew little. The integrity of the case brought against the suspects in Britain wouldn't be threatened.
What is now threatening the integrity of the criminal justice system is the internment of foreign terrorist suspects without trial or knowledge of the charges against them. Their claim that their detention is illegal was rejected by the Court of Appeal in August and is cur rently being considered by the Law Lords. Most media attention has been on the main argument by human rights groups that the law is discriminatory because it allows foreigners to be detained indefinitely while British citizens enjoy full civil rights. This is one of the many occasions when liberals should be careful of what they wish for.
The Government could very easily become a model of impartiality by interning British citizens alongside the alleged enemy aliens. David Blunkett has dropped strong hints that he would want to do just that if there was an Islamist attack on Britain, and I doubt if he would be stopped by a wave of public revulsion.
Far less attention has been given to the ruling by two of the three judges on the Court of Appeal that it was fine to hold men on the basis of evidence extracted by torture. No one can actually say that this happened because, contrary to all the principles of English justice, they aren't allowed to know what they are meant to have done. But their lawyers suspect that they have been jailed because of confessions from inmates at Guantanamo Bay who have been threatened with dogs, stripped and kept in solitary confinement. Their allegation goes way beyond the charge that the security services followed up leads from brutal foreign agencies. It suggests that people are being held indefinitely in British jails because a naked man beset by dogs named him to placate his tormentors.
So what, snapped the Court of Appeal. There is no other way, blubbed Lord Falconer.
Their accommodation with torture is astonishing on many levels. The first is its hypocrisy. The court said that the British state was still forbidden from conniving in or procuring torture. If its agents reached for the cosh or the electric flex, they would be breaking the law. But if evidence extracted by foreign torturers was now admissible, why should the gloves be kept on British hardmen? Why should our boys be held back simply because of their British citizenship?
The Court of Appeal had no coherent answer, and the nonchalance with which it endorsed foreign torturers showed how feeble national traditions have become. Until the war of terror, it was inconceivable that an English court would accept that a man could be jailed on the basis of torture, albeit torture conducted by shifty foreigners. The English didn't do torture. Uniquely in medieval Christendom, the English common law forbad the extraction of evidence under duress.
The exception to the benign rule was the Court of Star Chamber, which was allowed to torture the king's enemies. Its barbaric practices were one cause of the civil war. Such was the hatred it aroused that 'Star Chamber justice' remains a contemptuous condemnation of arbitrary power to this day.
Writing at the high point of liberal Victorian self-confidence Lord Macaulay said that Star Chamber was an aberration which, 'after the lapse of more than two centuries,' was still 'held in deep abhorrence by the nation'. It 'displayed a rapacity, a violence, a malignant energy, which had been unknown to any former age'. I'm not sure if the English can be quite as self-confident about the decency of the national tradition today. It's not that Star Chamber is back, rather that, as with so many other services, torture has been out-sourced to the third world where bothersome regulation is less intrusive.
What is dispiriting about the degeneracy of the Government and the Court of Appeal is that the old lessons have to be learned once again. The reasons why first England and then the civilised world rejected torture were practical as well as moral. Most people break under torture. Most people say whatever they have to say to stop the pain. When names are suggested to them, they agree. If the torturer wants to implicate the innocent or invent imaginary plots, he usually gets what he wants from his victim.
If the Law Lords doubt the wisdom of centuries and are considering upholding the Court of Appeal's verdict, may I suggest a small experiment? If they give me a law officer, the Lord Chancellor perhaps, or the Director of Public Prosecutions, and a couple of heavies, and leave us alone in a locked room, I think I can guarantee that within a week he will have revealed that the entire senior judiciary are members of al-Qaeda.
By Paul Waugh Deputy Political Editor, Evening Standard
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/articles/16537695?source=Evening%20Standard
11 February 2005
The appointment of John Scarlett as head of MI6 was overseen by two key Government officials embroiled in the David Kelly affair, secret Whitehall documents have revealed.
Papers released under the Freedom of Information Act show that Sir Kevin Tebbit and Sir David Omand were on the panel that recommended Mr Scarlett for the post of "C".
Sir Kevin, the permanent secretary at the MoD, and Sir David, Downing Street's intelligence co- ordinator, recommended him to Jack Straw and Tony Blair.
Sir Kevin was quizzed at the Hutton inquiry over the MoD's decision to identify Dr Kelly. Sir David was among those to decide that he should be pursued for talking to the media about the Government's dossier on Iraq's alleged WMD.
Mr Scarlett's appointment in May last year triggered controversy because he was chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee that drafted the dossier. He was appointed before the Butler inquiry into intelligence blunders had finished.
http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/news/articles/16537695?source=Evening%20Standard
by Richard Norton-Taylor
The Guardian - http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0%2C11026%2C1268216%2C00.html
Saturday July 24th 2004
The number of telephones wrongly tapped by the security and intelligence agencies is "still unacceptably high", according to the latest annual report by the interception of communications watchdog.
Errors were committed by GCHQ, MI5, MI6, customs, and security officials attached to the Northern Ireland Office says Sir Swinton Thomas, a retired appeal court judge.
His report was slipped out on Thursday, the last day of parliament before the long summer recess.
He says that in one case, the Northern Ireland Office told him it intended to add a new mobile telephone number to an interception warrant. "Unfortunately the mobile telephone number cited on the modification [of the warrant] was that of a serving police officer and not a number used by the target," says the judge.
In another case, customs officers obtained two warrants for two mobile phone numbers provided by the Dutch police running a parallel operation. "It transpired that the mobile numbers were incorrect in that an additional digit was included."
The report reveals that the home secretary approved 1,878 warrants for the interception of telephones, emails, and mail last year and that 705 were still in force on December 31st.
The Scottish Secretary approved 105 warrants. The number of warrants signed off by the foreign secretary and Northern Ireland Secretary are not disclosed on the grounds that it would "aid the operation of agencies hostile to the state".
The figures represent an increase over the previous year but do not quite match the record year of 2000.
The majority of warrants issued in England, Wales and Scotland were "related to the prevention and detection of serious crime", says Sir Swinton. He reports that he is as "satisfied as it is possible to be that deliberate unlawful interception of communications of the citizen does not take place".
The most common cause of mistakes, he says, is the simple transposition of numbers".
A total of 39 errors were reported to him. The Security Service, MI5, reported 11 mistakes. Telephone numbers were attributed to the wrong targets, and in one case individual digits within a number were transposed.
The Secret Intelligence Service, MI6, told the judge that on one occasion a mobile phone number was kept on a warrant after the line was disconnected.
In a further case, a typing error by customs officers led to the wrong surname on a warrant.
Sir Swinton, whose official title is Interception of Communications Commissioner, concludes that interception last year played a "vital part in the battle against terrorism and serious crime" and that he is satisfied that ministers and the law enforcement and intelligence agencies carried out this task "diligently and in accordance with the law".
The government released a related report on Thursday by Lord Brown, a serving appeal court judge who as Intelligence Services Commissioner is responsible for monitoring covert surveillance operations.
He declined to disclose the number of surveillance warrants obtained, but says he trusts the Security and Intelligence Agencies. "There are more than enough legitimate targets for the various intelligence agencies to focus upon and therefore little if any temptation for them to seek to engage upon inappropriate operations".
By Colin Brown, Deputy Political Editor
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=547444
03 August 2004
The Government refused yesterday to deny an authoritative report that John Scarlett, the former head of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), asked the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) to include 10 "golden nuggets" in its report on weapons of mass destruction, including a claim that it had smallpox weapons or was trying to produce them.
Mr Scarlett is also said to have suggested to the ISG they include a claim that Iraq probably possessed mobile biological weapons laboratories, and that Saddam Hussein was developing a "rail gun" which could propel an object at enormous speed along a track.
But the Prime Minister's official spokesman insisted Mr Scarlett, the new head of MI6, did not "mislead" Britain over an e-mail suggesting the "golden nuggets" be put in a report by the US- backed investigation.
A Number 10 spokeswoman said: "There's no question of the Government or any of its departments or agencies, and that includes the JIC and its then chairman John Scarlett, seeking to mislead the ISG." The allegations were made by Tom Mangold, a respected journalist and friend of the family of Dr David Kelly, the weapons expert whose suicide was investigated by the Hutton inquiry. That report cleared the Government of "sexing up" the Iraq dossiers against the wishes of the intelligence services.
The revelation that Mr Scarlett tried to influence the ISG yesterday brought fresh calls for him to step down from his new post as "C", the head of Britain's intelligence services, which he took up officially on Sunday. Sir Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrat foreign affairs spokesman, has for the first time joined Tory and Labour MPs yesterday in calling for the resignation of Mr Scarlett.
The MI6 chief was criticised in the Butler inquiry on the flawed intelligence on Iraq for allowing the dossiers to be published with the JIC's authority. There was criticism in the Commons of Tony Blair for promoting Mr Scarlett in spite of the intelligence failures. MPs claimed it was a reward for the JIC's approval of the dossiers.
Sir Menzies said on BBC radio: "I find it very difficult to see how Mr Scarlett can command the necessary public confidence. I'm not one of those who make ritual calls for resignations but I've come to the view that, so controversial now is Mr Scarlett, the necessary element of public confidence will be lacking."
The MP for Fife North East also called for a House of Commons select committee to scrutinise the workings of British intelligence. Under the present system, the Prime Minister appoints the members of the existing Commons Intelligence and Security Committee. "I think we should be much more open with these issues," Sir Menzies said.
The head of the ISG, David Kay, appalled the White House and Downing Street when he resigned in January, saying there were no WMD in Iraq. The Scarlett e- mail was sent to Mr Kay's replacement, Charles Duelfer on 8 March, this year. The ISG has yet to deliver its definitive report, although Mr Blair has now admitted that WMD may not be found in Iraq.
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=547444
http://www.sundayherald.com/42752
By Neil Mackay, Home Affairs Editor - 12June2004
MI5 has caused outrage after one of its spies stated publicly that the IRA fought a just cause and won a successful campaign during the 30-year Troubles in Northern Ireland.
The Sunday Herald is unable to name the MI5 officer following a threat of legal action from the government . However, the spys comments have provoked fury from the victims of IRA violence and Ulster politicians.
The controversy centres on a briefing given by the MI5 officer, a former Royal Navy commander, at a maritime security conference on Orkney. Details have been given to the Sunday Herald by Mark Hirst, the former head of communications at Orkney Islands Council, who attended the seminar.
The conference was held by the Department of Transport (DoT) in Kirkwall. Delegates included representatives from the council, port authorities, ferry services, energy firms, the tourist board and police.
Hirst says the MI5 officer said the IRA was the biggest threat to British national security. But the officer then said in our opinion they [the IRA] have fought a just cause.
The conclusion of MI5, according to this officer, said Hirst, was based on the fact there had been legitimate grievances among, and discrimination against, the nationalist community and this had sustained the IRA through the length of the campaign.
The MI5 officer then added: Has it been a successful campaign? The answer is yes.
Hirst said: He referred to the fact Sinn Fein had two ministers in power. What better success can you wish for, he said, than to have your people in positions of power in government.
Hirst said the comments were not off-the-cuff as they were supported by an official MI5 PowerPoint presentation, complete with the official crest.
Presumably this was sanctioned at some level, he added.
The DoT confirmed that the briefing took place, adding: This was part of a programme to ensure that security staff at UK ports were up to date with the terrorism threat they are countering. We are not prepared to comment further .
Orkney Council declined to comment. However, William Frazer, who runs Fair (Families Acting for Innocent Relatives), a Northern Ireland support group for victims of paramilitary violence, was horrified .
Frazers father, a member of the security forces, was killed by the IRA, as were two uncles and two cousins. Five of his friends were also murdered, and his home was bombed five times.
He said the officers claims reinforced his belief that the government and intelligence agencies controlled the IRA campaign, using double-agents to manage republican violence. Frazer pointed to Freddie Scappaticci, codenamed Stakeknife, who was exposed by the Sunday Herald last year. Scappaticci, who worked for British intelligence, was also one of the IRAs highest-ranking volunteers.
The MI5 officers comments back up the fact there was no determination to beat the IRA, said Frazer, who is now writing to the Prime Minister in protest. It is a disgrace to the memory of victims. He is talking about the killing of innocent people .
This MI5 officer needs to be held to account. What this man is saying is treason it shows the dirty war really was dirty.
A senior source in the intelligence services said: I am staggered by these comments.
But Kevin Fulton, a former double-agent who infiltrated the IRA, said he was not surprised by the MI5 officers comment. He said : The insight I have leads me to ask who was running this war?. I believe it was run from London.
Martin Ingram, a former intelligence officer in the armys spying arm, the Force Research Unit, said: I think what this officer is saying is an honest appraisal. The nationalist community was unjustly treated and that led to the resurgence of the IRA, although I disagree with the IRAs methodology.
What this man has said will be detrimental to his career , but there are those in senior positions in MI5 who would probably agree with him.
Hardline unionist MP, Jeffrey Donaldson, said it was totally out of order for an MI5 officer to make such statements. How would MI5 explain this officers comments to people who lost loved ones in Enniskillen, La Mon House or the Shankill bombing? It is incredible that a man in his position would justify the slaughter of innocent civilians and the security forces.
It is still an offence to be a traitor and this mans comments are treacherous. He is betraying Britain. He should be removed immediately.
13 June 2004
By Paul Mitchell
9 December 2003
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/dec2003/kgun-d09.shtml
Katherine Gun, an intelligence officer at the British government's secret surveillance headquarters, was arrested in March under the Official Secrets Act on charges of passing information to an unauthorised person. She admits she leaked a secret memo to a British newspaper about US-UK government surveillance of the United Nations before the war in Iraq.
Lawyers appointed for Gun by the human rights organisation Liberty told magistrates at London's Bow Street court that Gun is pleading 'defence of necessity.' In a statement issued after her court appearance on November 27, she said, "I have today indicated to the court that I intend to plead not guilty to the charge that I face under the Official Secrets Act. I will defend the charge against me on the basis that my actions were necessary to prevent an illegal war in which thousands of Iraqi civilians and British soldiers would be killed or maimed. No one has suggested (nor could they) that I sought or received any payment. I have only ever followed my conscience. I have been heartened by the many messages of support and encouragement that I have received from Britain and around the world."
Gun was granted bail and told to return to Bow Street on January 19 when a magistrate will decide on sending the case to a Crown Court.
The leaked memo that appeared in the Observer newspaper was from US National Security Agency (NSA) official Frank Koza to his counterparts at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in Britain where Gun worked as a translator. In the memo, Koza asked GCHQ to help with the secret surveillance of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) delegations that were considered to be wavering over the drive to war against Iraq.
According to intelligence sources quoted by the Observer, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice would have initiated the memo or at least approved it.
Koza's memo, marked Top Secret, explained how the NSA had mounted 'a surge effort to revive/create efforts against UNSC members Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria and Guinea, as well as extra focus on Pakistan UN matters.'
The NSA effort, Koza said, would help provide 'the whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises.'
Koza asked for the help of British analysts who 'might have similar, more indirect access to valuable information from accesses in your product lines?' spy jargon for bugging work and home telephones and intercepting e-mails.
The publication of Koza's memo in early March came at a particularly sensitive time for the British and American governments as they tried to get support for a second UN resolution authorising war against Iraq. In the face of unprecedented worldwide demonstrations against the threat of war and the intention of major UNSC powers such as France and Germany to vote against a second resolution, the votes of the minor nations were crucial. In the event, the US and UK were forced to go to war on March 21 without a UN mandate.
The seriousness with which the Bush and Blair administrations regarded the leak can be measured by the speed in which Gun was arrested, within days of publication of the Observer article, and the virtual blackout of the issue in the US media. Martin Bright, an Observer journalist involved in the Gun case, told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation that interviews planned with major news networks were abandoned at the last minute. Bright said, "It happened with NBC, Fox TV and CNN who appeared very excited about the story to the extent of sending cars to my house to get me into the studio, and at the last minute, were told by their American desks to drop the story."
The New York Times did not mention the story, and other newspapers downplayed its significance. The Washington Post said, 'UN diplomats and analysts said that espionage had been a fact of life at the UN since its founding in 1945, and they assume they are being monitored by many foreign intelligence agencies.'
The Los Angeles Times said, 'Forgery or no, some say it's nothing to get worked up about.'
Whilst the UN has no doubt been a hotbed of intrigue and spying since its inception, the Gun case could not be dismissed by anyone not wishing to conceal the illegal acts the US and British governments employed to pave the way for an illegal war.
Gun's actions occurred at a time when there was concern within broad sections of the British ruling elite, including the security services, that a too close identification with the war aims of the Bush administration and the Blair government's readiness to forge intelligence and commit other crimes was threatening Britain's own strategic interests.
Since the Hutton Inquiry was held into the death of weapons inspector Dr. David Kelly, there have been further calls for a more in-depth inquiry into how the British government used intelligence material in the run-up to the Iraq war. Former Labour environment minister Michael Meacher and former US weapons inspector Scott Ritter have called for investigations into secret disinformation operations called Rockingham and Mass Appeal. According to Ritter, Rockingham was set up by the British Defence Intelligence Service in 1991 to 'cherry-pick' facts to fit a 'pre-ordained outcome' to prove that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction.
Ritter told the British House of Commons last month that he was involved with MI6's Mass Appeal campaign to "shake up public opinion" using "single source data of dubious quality, which lacked veracity." Saying he would reveal more details in a public inquiry, Ritter told the parliamentarians that the intelligence services "took this information and peddled it off to the media, internationally and domestically, allowing inaccurate intelligence data to appear on the front pages. The government both here in the UK and US would feed off these media reports, continuing the perception that Iraq was a nation ruled by a leader with an addiction to WMDs."
We spoke to Barry Hugill, a spokesman for Liberty and asked him why Katharine Gun is using the plea of 'defence of necessity.' He replied, "Essentially it means that she is going to argue that faced with the American government asking the British government to commit an illegal act, she felt no other option than to make public what was going on behind the scenes. Unlike a normal job, she works at GCHQ and is bound by the Official Secrets Act (OSA) so she couldn't simply report it to her superiors because they would have known full well what was happening.
"She will argue that it was her own belief that Britain going to war was itself an illegal act and that America was attempting to unfairly influence the UNSC. By acting in the way she did, albeit if it was in a small way, she felt it could have helped prevent war and therefore save countless lives. So the 'necessity' was to prevent an illegal act and to prevent a great human tragedy."
We asked Hugill whether this was the first time that a plea of defence of necessity has been used. He said that it was: "This will be a test case. The plea was not used by David Shayler [the MI6 spy charged in 2000 with revealing that the British security services held files on prominent Labour politicians and celebrities such as John Lennon, but not for his claim that the security services blacked a plot to assassinate Libyan leader Colonel Qaddafi], but he was told during his trial that he could have used the defence."
Under the Official Secrets Act, the prosecution has only to prove that Gun passed secret information to an unauthorised person. As she has already admitted this, we asked Hugill whether he thought there was any chance that more revealing information may emerge; for example, did the British government comply with the American request?
He replied, "That is a very interesting question. I'm sure Katharine would like to find out if that was the case. It is difficult at this stage to know what defence her lawyers will mount. There is speculation that they might try and subpoena the Attorney General. Do you remember the report he allegedly gave to the Cabinet saying support for the war would be legal? And how other press reports said he did not give such advice. It may be that Katherine's QC Ben Emerson, probably Britain's leading human rights lawyer, might call the Attorney General to clear up this matter. Whatever happens this is going to be a very interesting trial."
We asked if it is true that Miss Gun is restricted in what she can discuss with her legal representatives?
Hugill replied: "Yes. There is a dispute at the moment with GCHQ that is yet to be resolved over what she can and cannot say. They are arguing that she is still covered by the Official Secrets Act and anything she says she has to have prior permission from GCHQ, otherwise she will be in breach of the OSA again.
"Katharine was charged in March and normally a decision to prosecute is taken fairly quickly - a month or two. But it wasn't until last month that a decision was taken. The fact that it took that long is a clear indication that some very earnest discussions were being taken at a very senior level. It is quite inconceivable that the decision to prosecute in this case - given the publicity that a court will generate - was taken in the standard way. Usually a relatively junior member of the Crown Prosecution Service decides whether a case should go ahead. In this case, it would have had political approval and that would be the Attorney General."
We asked whether he thought the delay in the case was related to the government's preoccupation with the Hutton Inquiry.
Hugill replied, "I'm sure there was one school of thought that was arguing, "Don't bring charges. Just let it drop. There will be a couple of stories in the newspapers and that will be the end of it given the public opposition to war, given the Hutton Inquiry and given the fact that, after all, the Americans were asking us to spy on our own allies."
"On the other hand there must have been enormous pressure from GCHQ and the intelligence services saying, "You can't operate something like GCHQ without strict application of the OSA. If you allow one person to leak secrets, then you will open the floodgates.""
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/dec2003/kgun-d09.shtml
An impeccable source tells me that companies around the UK that do ambulance conversions on vehicles, such as Wadham Stringer near Southampton, got a lot of work in 2003 converting new ambulances for MI5. This may have been justified with any number of lame excuses but the fact remains that we now have a permenant presence of political police (sitting in pretend ambulances) on British streets.
This discredits genuine hard working ambulance men and women and leaves the gestapo elements (the 'crazies') at MI5 perfectly poised to carry out domestic political assassinations. When an ambulance takes someone away everyone trusts that the drivers have good intentions. And does MI5's boss Eliza Manningham-Buller really believe she can get away with secreting her political police around the country dressed as ambulancemen?
Next time you see an estate car marked 'ambulance' sitting around doing nothing in your city why not ask the driver if they're a genuine ambulance, or if they work for the gestapo?
http://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=446074
Scarlett's
cronyism resulted in precisely the sort of intelligence failure the JIC was
designed to prevent
23 September 2003
As the Hutton inquiry rumbles to its conclusion this week, most of the attention has focused on what the final report will say about the role played by the key political figures involved in the drama. But more important than the fate of Geoff Hoon is what the Kelly affair says about our style of government. Today's cross-examination of John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the man Alastair Campbell yesterday claimed had full control of the dossier, will fill in some important gaps about the process that led Britain to war.
Whether or not one feels comfortable with the phrase "sexed-up" ("over-interpreted" was Hans Blix's more sober judgement), it is no longer possible to deny that the intelligence on Iraq was grossly distorted in the months leading up to the war and that the process of distortion involved sins of both commission and omission.
Work on the September dossier began after the existing assessment on Iraq failed to establish a clear enough threat and Alastair Campbell asked the JIC to come up with something "new" and "revelatory". The effect of his intervention was to turn the proper decision-making process on its head. From that point on intelligence followed the policy and not the other way round. The language describing the Iraqi threat was progressively hardened and the notorious 45-minute claim made its first appearance.
Every bit as serious was what the dossier neglected to tell us. The Government presented it as an accurate account of the intelligence on which it was in the process of making life or death decisions, but in its tone of certainty it bore little resemblance to the work of the JIC as it is presented for consumption within Whitehall. JIC assessments are carefully hedged, sometimes maddeningly so. While it may be true that the JIC believed the 45-minute claim to be a valid piece of intelligence, I am certain that its internal communications would have made it clear that it referred to battlefield munitions only and that it was based on the hearsay testimony of a single source. Neither fact was shared with the public.
Perhaps the most damning evidence to emerge from the Hutton inquiry is the fact that the Government knew exactly how flimsy its case was, but chose to keep its doubts to itself. Tony Blair's own chief of staff, Jonathan Powell, was blunt in his assessment that "the document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam", and that this would need to be made clear in the dossier. Yet Mr Blair did the opposite, claiming in his foreword that the threat from Saddam was "serious and current".
In taking the country to war, the Government had a duty to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. The September dossier failed on all three counts.
The Government's last line of defence in the face of these revelations has been to pass the buck. Everything was subject to the agreement of the JIC, whose chairman, Mr Scarlett, had "ownership" of the dossier. This may be true, but it begs its own question: who had ownership of Mr Scarlett?
The evidence presented to Hutton reveals an alarming departure in British constitutional practice in which Britain's most senior intelligence official was in effect co-opted into the Prime Minister's kitchen cabinet. Mr Scarlett should have had no business dealing with a political appointee like Mr Campbell, let alone becoming his "mate". Indeed, the JIC should never have been put in the position of negotiating the terms of its assessment with anyone outside the intelligence community.
It is simply risible of Mr Campbell to claim, as he did yesterday, that his role in drawing up the dossier was purely "presentational". As every New Labour functionary knows, presentation and policy are indivisible. They know this because Alastair Campbell beat it into their heads.
The strength of the British intelligence system has always rested on the objectivity of its analytical output and its ability to present its work without regard to political considerations. The JIC was specifically set up to provide a single source of intelligence advice, thereby avoiding the catastrophic intelligence failures that occur when different agencies are allowed to jockey for advantage by telling politicians what they want to hear.
John Scarlett's descent into cronyism subverted this process and resulted in precisely the sort of intelligence failure it was designed to prevent. His interventions reveal a man more interested in pleasing his political masters than protecting the integrity of a system on which the security of our country depends. He even passed on a last-minute plea from Downing Street for the intelligence services to provide any additional information that might help to make the dossier "as strong as possible".
By inflating the language used to describe Iraq's capabilities against the stated opinions of its own experts and systematically filtering out any intelligence that conflicted with the Government's stated view that Saddam represented a major threat, the JIC crossed the line dividing legitimate intelligence analysis from propaganda. Our confidence in it will not be restored unless its chairman takes responsibility for this debacle by resigning his post.
The writer was political adviser at the Foreign Office, 1997-2001.
http://argument.independent.co.uk/commentators/story.jsp?story=446074
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=430327
04 August 2003
Fresh conflict between the Government and the intelligence services looked certain yesterday after it was revealed that the head of MI6 was quitting his post.
The Foreign Office confirmed that Sir Richard Dearlove, 58, who was appointed in 1999 as "C", will retire from the Secret Intelligence Service in August next year. Sir Richard, who has consistently expressed doubts over the Government's claims about Iraq's military capability, has installed an unnamed deputy who he hopes will become his successor.
But Downing Street is believed to favour John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, who endorsed the Government's September dossier on Iraqi weapons, including the controversial claim that some weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes.
Mr Scarlett, a former MI6 officer who served as head of the Moscow station, is close to Tony Blair and was described last month as a friend by Alastair Campbell, No 10's director of communications.
Sir Richard has briefed senior BBC executives that he believed Syria and Iran were more of a threat to security than Iraq. He met Kevin Marsh, editor of BBC Radio 4's Today programme, and the presenter John Humphrys, before the programme broadcast its original claims about the Government "sexing up" its dossier.
He was worried that the war in Iraq would divert resources from the greater threat posed by al- Qa'ida. While he had no problem with the substance of the September dossier, he had concerns about its presentation. His fury at the so-called "dodgy dossier" of February, which was based on a PhD student's thesis, led to a promise from Mr Blair that all future reports would have full intelligence clearance. The appointment of Sir Richard's successor, to be made personally by the Prime Minister, is now likely to turn into a battle for the perceived independence of MI6.
The Foreign Office said: "Sir Richard Dearlove intends to leave his post as planned in August 2004 on completion of his normal tour of office. This is in no way connected to events relating to Iraq."
Menzies Campbell, the Liberal Democrats' foreign affairs spokesman, said Sir Richard's departure was the result of difficulties in the relationship between the Government and the intelligence agencies.
http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/story.jsp?story=430327
10:30 - 22 July 2003
The sacked GCHQ worker arrested on suspicion of breaching the Official Secrets Act has launched an appeal against her dismissal. The 28-year-old was arrested in March after being accused of passing a secret memo to The Observer newspaper.
She was sacked by GCHQ bosses earlier this month but has since launched an internal appeal.
But the process has been delayed because the director of GCHQ has been on holiday.
Her petition has been further hampered because intelligence director David Pepper is taking part in a "meet and greet" tour of GCHQ installations.
GCHQ union boss Andy Shepherd said: "The appeal went to the director of GCHQ.
"But he has been on holiday and doing a round of visits to meet staff.
"So nothing has happened yet."
The woman, who is still living in Gloucestershire, is waiting to see if she will be charged by police and is due to answer bail on Thursday.
But she faces a second delay as government officials liaise with the Crown Prosecution Service.
Liberty, the human rights organisation which is representing her, says the death of MOD scientist David Kelly will delay any potential prosecution.
The secret memo allegedly leaked was from Frank Koza, US defence chief of staff at the National Security Agency. It suggested that security staff should bug UN delegates in New York.
[referring to Charles Henry Maxwell-Knight, 'M']
His first wife Gladys, I learnt, died in the Overseas Club after some sort of occult misadventure in which the notorious Aleister Crowley was involved - certainly I'd never been willing to enquire too deeply into that incident. Black magic was not a subject that held any attraction for me. I accepted M's interest in it, hoping it was purely acdemic, but, for myself, I preferred to leave it well and truly alone: M understood this. When I tore up a photograph of Aleister Crowley which he had kept, as I believed it to be unlucky, he only laughed.
Saturday 28th June 2003
http://www.it-director.com/article.php?articleid=10993
A government watchdog has criticised GCHQ for wasting money on technology designed to gather intelligence on terrorist networks. The security organisation was forced to write off an undisclosed sum spent on developing a signals intelligence system to listen to transmissions on network traffic such as radio and email.
The Intelligence and Security Committee criticised GCHQ in its report earlier this month for the technology expenditure which had only "partially" delivered.
"The committee is concerned about the size of the planned write off that GCHQ is having to make in the next year for a developmental signals intelligence system that has only partially delivered the intended capability," it said. Neither the committee nor GCHQ would reveal the sums involved.
It recognised that developmental work is "not always successful" and that the accounting system requires the agency to "highlight the cost of capital equipment".
However, the committee underlined that GCHQ "must learn the lessons from this experience".
A GCHQ statement countered that it has already carried out a review which showed that "most of the work undertaken had been successful. The write-off related to less than one third of the cutting-edge development programme."
A GCHQ spokesman added: "We have learned some lessons and put them into place."
Neil Barratt, technical director at Information Risk Management, said: "Research costs [money] and, when it's bleeding edge, it costs even more.
"Intercepting is a piece of cake. Processing and analysing information is where signals intelligence goes belly up."
An original article from www.vnunet.com Copyright VNU Business Publications Ltd
http://www.it-director.com/article.php?articleid=10993
The Cheltenham woman arrested on suspicion of breaching the Official Secrets Act has been sacked by GCHQ.
The 28-year-old was arrested in March after being accused of passing a secret memo to The Observer newspaper. The woman, who is still living in Gloucestershire, is waiting to see if she will be charged by police and is due to answer bail in July.
She has been represented by local criminal solicitor Joti Bopa Rai.
She is also taking advice from Liberty, one of the UK's leading human rights and civil liberties organisations.
The woman has consulted with Liberty's director John Wadham who took on the Government in the case of former MI5 officer David Shayler, who was jailed for six months in November for breaching the Official Secrets Act.
The Crown Prosecution Service has yet to decide whether the former GCHQ worker will be charged.
A Human Rights specialist has expressed doubts as to whether the Government will continue with the case.
The source, who asked not to be named said: "This case is going to be massive if it goes ahead and there are all sorts of questions that would need to be asked.
"It would be better for the Government and for GCHQ if it was quietly dropped."
GCHQ would not say whether the woman was still on the payroll.
A spokesman said: "We can't comment on anything at a personal level concerning individual employees."
The secret memo allegedly leaked was from Frank Koza, US defence chief of staff at the National Security Agency, which like GCHQ in Cheltenham, monitors international communications.
It suggested that security staff should bug UN delegates in New York. GCHQ is said to have been asked by the NSA to intercept phone messages and emails to help build a case for war in Iraq.
The operation was targeted at the six countries that were at the time undecided on conflict in Iraq: Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria, Guinea and Pakistan.
The document was circulated among British intelligence services on January 31.
The woman was arrested on March 5 by Gloucestershire police and was bailed 24 hours later.
The leaked memo from Mr Koza, which is believed to have been authorised by US President George Bush's NSA adviser Condoleeza Rice, sparked an internal investigation at GCHQ.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,968575,00.html
David Leigh Monday June 2, 2003 The Guardian
Laws that allow British intelligence agents to bug and burgle are to be amended to permit bribery as well, as an unexpected consequence of the government's latest anti-corruption proposals.
In a draft bill issued this year by the Home Office minister Lord Falconer, the only clause to get noticed was one which fulfilled the government's pledge to make it a criminal offence for MPs to take "brown envelopes" full of money, as in the Neil Hamilton case.
But the corruption bill also includes a more obscure set of clauses under which MI5, MI6 and GCHQ are given a licence to bribe, both inside and outside Britain.
The foreign secretary and the home secretary will be able to give the agencies blanket authorisations to pay bribes to a "reasonable" extent, in the same way that they are already allowed to break into homes and plant bugs.
It has been necessary to write the intelligence services yet another exemption from the law because the government is aiming to tighten up 1906 anti-corruption legislation, and has also created a wide ban on bribing foreign officials to get contracts.
MI6 and MI5 often recruit informants inside domestic banks, companies and the state organisations of countries on which they are spying.
In recent years, they have been discovered for example, using machine-tool company executives to spy on Iraq, and bank officials in the Cayman Islands to hand over secret account information about the transactions of the Russian mafia.
The process of bringing the intelligence agencies out of the shadows and under some form of statutory control began nine years ago with the 1994 Intelligence Services Act. This gave MI6 a general licence to commit crimes abroad.
But in the process of reviewing corruption law, it appears to have dawned on MI5, the domestic security service, that its officers are, in theory, liable to prosecution for paying bribes to agents and informants inside Britain.
The Home Office says its proposals will increase control of the behaviour of spies. "This new system will be kept under review by the intelligence services commissioner."
http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianpolitics/story/0,3605,968575,00.html
By Mark Huband, Security Correspondent
http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=030505000840&query=MI6&vsc_appId=totalSearch&state=Form
Financial Times; May 05, 2003
The UK's foreign intelligence service has stepped up its staff recruitment in response to terrorist threats and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Although the global campaign against al-Qaeda has damaged the terrorist network, its supporters are thought to be joining other groups, making the security services' task more difficult.
The Secret Intelligence Service, widely known as MI6, is recruiting 40 staff members annually and training them to be "front line" officers posted abroad with the task of recruiting spies and informers. The service, which was scaled down after the cold war, will soon return to its former size.
The pace of recruitment is now double that of the Foreign Office and will increase the size of the SIS staff to just below 2,000. Cutbacks in the 1990s saw its entire staff shrink to 1,600, officials say.
But the attacks in the US on September 11 2001 and concerns about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, have given SIS a central role in traditional intelligence gathering and the formation of government security policy.
The depletion of staff posted abroad in the 1990s is regarded as having weakened the service. But new funds were allocated to SIS and MI5, the domestic Security Service, in the wake of the September 11 attacks to reflect the threat to the UK from non-state groups such as al-Qaeda.
SIS is focused on counter-terrorism, weapons proliferation and political instability in global areas afflicted with conflict, crime and narcotics - all of which are regarded as having a direct impact on the security of the UK.
Recruitment from ethnic minorities and the Muslim community has remained in proportion with the overall increase in the number of people applying, while the slump facing financial institutions has increased the number of recruits from business backgrounds.
The need for more Muslim recruits was demonstrated again by last week's suicide bomb attack in Israel, which was believed to have been carried out by two Britons. Yesterday, police were questioning three men and three women in connection with the bombing.
The service is led by Sir Richard Dearlove and has its headquarters on the Thames in a building known unofficially as "Legoland" at Vauxhall Cross. It has retained a degree of secrecy about its operations surpassed only by the Government Communications Headquarters eavesdropping centre in Cheltenham. This is unlikely to change, in spite of the need to attract a wider range of recruits.
A mark of how far this secrecy extends could be seen when Tony Blair, the prime minister, and George W. Bush, the US president, delivered post-summit statements on the war in Iraq at Camp David on March 27. The seats of top US and UK government officials had been clearly labelled in the front row, including one with the name "Dearlove".
However, unlike George Tenet, his CIA equivalent, Sir Richard, known as "C" in the service, did not take up his place, denying the press any opportunity to update a hazy university-era photograph of him, which is the only one to have been published.
http://search.ft.com/search/article.html?id=030505000840&query=MI6&vsc_appId=totalSearch&state=Form
by PETER HITCHENS, Mail on Sunday
http://www.femail.co.uk/pages/standard/article.html?in_page_id=2&in_article_id=170284
I really hope that MI5 has a file on me. In fact, I should be shocked and disappointed if it did not, for 30 years ago I was an active member of a far- Left organisation which really should have been kept under observation by the authorities.
And now I want to see that file, since there can be no possible reason for keeping it secret. First, it no longer has any bearing on me. I long ago grew up and changed my mind.
Second, it no longer has any bearing on the safety of the country, if it ever did. The world has turned upside down since those distant times. The Cold War, which linked some of the Left with our enemies in the USSR, is over. The USSR has ceased to exist.
What is more, many of those who were then revolutionaries or active Communist sympathisers are now part of the establishment, perhaps even Ministers or senior civil servants.
I am almost the only member of my student generation who is still truly anti-establishment. Perhaps MI5 fears that if it opens my files, it will come under pressure to open those on people who are now in power. Unlike me, many senior Labour figures would prefer to forget this era.
I am not seeking my file because I object to it, or because I want to complain or sue. I am genuinely curious about what is in it, that's all.
So, when the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, announced last year that such files could now be opened, I wrote to MI5 and asked for mine.
It looked straightforward. Mr Blunkett had told Parliament that MI5 could not refuse my request, provided 'data about an individual is not required for the purpose of safeguarding national security'. That seemed clear. If it applied to anyone, it applied to me. My dabblings with the International Socialists three decades ago obviously didn't have any bearing on national security now.
But it was not to be. Mr Blunkett's words appear to count for nothing in the secret world, where the excuse of 'national security' can be stretched far beyond reason to prevent the publication of anything.
All I have to show for my efforts is a polite refusal on some rather nice MI5 headed paper and a bill for £10 for a supposed search fee. This Tuesday, I will be going before the Information Tribunal, at the wonderfully named International Dispute Resolution Centre, in a final attempt to break through the musty blanket of silly secrecy which surrounds this episode.
I am not allowed to tell you exactly how silly this is. I am forbidden to quote from or make any other use of the documents supplied to me in advance of Tuesday's hearing, which sum up the Government's defence of its position - though if I were to do so I don't think that either national security or the cause of justice would be harmed one bit.
But here is the fascinating thing. MI5 is not just refusing to show me my files. They will not even tell me if they have a file on me. Merely to admit this is said to be too risky.
Well, forgive me, but there are Cabinet papers more recent than this which have now been opened to the public gaze without any harm being done. I think it pretty unlikely that there is anything in my MI5 file - if it exists - more sensitive than that.
I also think there is little chance that the file will give anything away about serving MI5 agents. If there were such people among us they will have long ago become too old to spy on student revolutionaries, or on anyone else much. Intelligence and security people tend to retire early anyway.
As for their methods, let me remind you that in 1970 there were no mobile phones and no personal computers. I have a feeling that MI5's technology may have moved forward a bit since then too.
No, the MI5 case is painfully thin and I just hope that the Information Tribunal will take a good hard look at the excuses being offered, compare them with the Home Secretary's own words, and let me see those files.
http://www.femail.co.uk/pages/standard/article.html?in_page_id=2&in_article_id=170284
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,886685,00.html
Richard Norton-Taylor
Saturday February 1, 2003
The Guardian
The government yesterday named David Pepper, an expert in information technology, to be the new head of GCHQ, its electronic eavesdropping centre based in Cheltenham.
Mr Pepper, 55, will take over from Sir Francis Richards. Sir Francis has been appointed to be the new governor of Gibraltar.
Mr Pepper joined GCHQ after studying physics at Oxford University. He was seconded to the Home Office five years ago as director of corporate development.
He is an also in expert in Whitehall's private finance initiative - the use of private firms to build and maintain public assets.
This is now highly relevant to the GCHQ, where a private consortium is building a new headquarters for the agency in a 30-year management deal worth £1.1bn.
GCHQ's new headquarters, called the Doughnut because of its circular shape and hollow centre, is itself estimated to cost £330m.
Parliament's intelligence and security committee has expressed serious concern about cost overruns and delays. It is due to be completed before the end of this year.
GCHQ maintains that the deal is 20% cheaper than the cost of maintaining its existing buildings over the same period. GCHQ, which monitors phone, email, and satellite communications, is playing a leading role in countering international terrorism as well as helping MI5 and MI6.
It has an annual budget of about £700m, the bulk of the £1bn spent each year by Britain's three security and intelligence agencies.
Jack Straw, the foreign secretary, yesterday described the job of GCHQ's director as "vitally important".
He referred to the "tireless work" its staff did "to protect our national security".
GCHQ's work was not officially admitted until the Geoffrey Prime spy scandal and a union ban - an entirely separate issue - in the Thatcher years. Now directions to it are signposted and it has an award-winning website.
Mr Pepper describes his leisure interests as music, reading, walking, and cooking.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,886685,00.html
A secret intelligence operation to spy on the families of the Deepcut victims is today exposed by the Sunday Express.
Senior officers at MI5 are understood to be working with the Army's Special Investigation Branch to monitor their movements.
The families have been calling for an inquiry into why four soldiers have been found shot dead in suspicious circumstances at the Royal Logistic Corps camp in Deepcut, Surrey.
Last night an MI5 insider confirmed the operation - also including the GCHQ eavesdropping station - was under way.
The insider said: "It has been going on for some months. They are trying to find out what the families are up to, and if they are planning concerted action."
On Friday, surveillance specialists from Tayside Police "swept" the Perth home of one of the victims, Private James Collinson. They found signals believed to be from bugging devices coming from a phone and a lamp.
The sweep was carried out at the request of Surrey Police who are investigating the deaths of Privates Collinson, 17, Geoff Gray 17, Cheryl James 18, and Sean Benton 20. The Ministry of Defence claim all four committed suicide. But their families believe there has been a cover-up after revelations of bullying and sexual harassment at the barracks.
Surrey officers asked for the sweep after hearing noises on phone lines during conversations with relatives.
Pte Collinson's parents, Jim and Yvonne, and other Deepcut families have repeatedly claimed their phone calls and emails are being intercepted.
Tayside police did not find any bugs but told Mrs Collinson to unplug the lamp and take precautions when using the phone. They advised her to buy a new SIM card for her mobile.
Mrs Collinson said last night, "There have been problems for months with strange noises and Ive heard a third person on the line."
At one time only the Home Secretary could authorise phone taps but new laws have given the power to the security service and chief constables. Alex Standish, editor of Jane's Intelligence Digest, said bugging - which can only be carried out in the interests of "national security" - was hard to justify in this case.
http://www.observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,873043,00.html
Nick Cohen Sunday January 12, 2003 The Observer
That was a close shave. The hospitals might have been clogged with corpses, if it hadn't been for the brilliant detective work of the Metropolitan Police and MI5. No potential juror can be in any doubt that our protectors foiled mass murderers. The seven men arrested in north London last week were, without question, al- Qaeda terrorists. Everyone says it. Everyone knows it.
'Britain's not just embracing terrorists, but housing them at the taxpayer's expense,' bellowed the Express. The Sun declared that the 'poison factory used to make deadly ricin is just 200 yards from the lair of one of Osama bin Laden's henchmen. Police racing against time to smash the terror network fear MORE fanatics may be plotting in the area.' Over at the Mail, Jane Corbin, a 'terrorism expert', wondered how high the assassins were aiming. 'Could a high-profile figure, the Prime Minister himself or another VIP, have been the target this time?' she mused. She wasn't sure - about this and much else. The attack might not have taken place in London, she continued. The ricin 'could have been destined for use in Manchester or Madrid or Munich' or any other city she could think of whose name began with 'M' - except Mecca. On one point she was certain. Corbin could assure jurors these men were 'terrorists'. Six were 'either Algerian or of North African origin, and the Algerian connection with Osama bin Laden goes back a long way.' QED.
Journalists working for the broadsheet press once had a greater respect for the rule of law. But size isn't important these days. The Times announced that 'terrorist leaders realis